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AWS outage on 2026-11-11

amazon.com
November 2026 11 Minor incident

AWS's AP-NORTHEAST-1 (Tokyo) region had elevated API error rates and launch failures lasting 5h 33m on 11 November 2026. The fault sat inside AWS's own infrastructure in a single availability zone, apne1-az1.

Started

15:40 UTC

Duration

Lasted 5h 33m

Source

IsDown

Next time

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Affected components: Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud, Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (Tokyo), Amazon Elastic Container Service, Amazon Elastic Container Service (Tokyo), Amazon Elastic Load Balancing, Amazon Elastic Load Balancing (Tokyo), Amazon Lightsail, Amazon Lightsail (Tokyo), AWS Fargate, AWS Fargate (Tokyo), AWS NAT Gateway, AWS NAT Gateway (Tokyo), AWS VPCE PrivateLink, AWS VPCE PrivateLink (Tokyo), Reachability Analyzer, Reachability Analyzer (Tokyo), Traffic Mirroring, Traffic Mirroring (Tokyo), Amazon Athena, Amazon Athena (Tokyo), Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service, Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service (Tokyo), Amazon FSx, Amazon FSx (Tokyo), Amazon Managed Workflows for Apache Airflow, Amazon Managed Workflows for Apache Airflow (Tokyo), Amazon WorkSpaces, Amazon WorkSpaces (Tokyo), AWS DataSync, AWS DataSync (Tokyo), AWS Glue, AWS Glue (Tokyo), AWS Storage Gateway, AWS Storage Gateway (Tokyo), AWS Transfer Family, AWS Transfer Family (Tokyo), Amazon Route 53 Resolver, Amazon Route 53 Resolver (Tokyo), Amazon Elastic File System, Amazon Elastic File System (Tokyo), Amazon Redshift, Amazon Redshift (Tokyo), Amazon Elastic MapReduce, Amazon Elastic MapReduce (Tokyo), Amazon EMR Serverless, Amazon EMR Serverless (Tokyo), AWS Transit Gateway, AWS Transit Gateway (Tokyo), AWS Database Migration Service, AWS Database Migration Service (Tokyo), Amazon DocumentDB, Amazon DocumentDB (Tokyo), Amazon ElastiCache, Amazon ElastiCache (Tokyo), Amazon Relational Database Service, Amazon Relational Database Service (Tokyo), Amazon SageMaker, Amazon SageMaker (Tokyo), AWS Cloud WAN, Amazon VPC Lattice, Amazon VPC Lattice (Tokyo)

What happened?

AWS logged one incident on this day, starting at 15:40 UTC and running for 5h 33m before resolution. The first update described elevated API error rates and launch failures concentrated in a single availability zone, apne1-az1, in the Tokyo region. By 16:40 UTC AWS reported that CloudWatch alarms for EC2 and EBS resources in that zone were moving into Insufficient Data state, that the DescribeInstanceStatus API was returning Insufficient Data, and that impact had spread to ECS and Fargate task launches, ELB provisioning, and NAT Gateway create and disassociate workflows. AWS told customers directly that running instances were not affected and that they should rely on their own health telemetry rather than the DescribeInstanceStatus signal during this window. Signs of recovery appeared from 17:38 UTC, with EC2 and EBS CloudWatch health data reporting correctly again. The recovery was not clean: at 18:54 UTC AWS reported a second, related problem, connectivity issues affecting newly created or modified instances in the same zone, touching new instance launches, cluster creation, autoscaling groups, gateways, and VPC gateway endpoints, while existing resources and instance-to-instance communication stayed unaffected. At 19:54 UTC AWS advised customers to launch new instances in the two healthy zones, apne1-az2 and apne1-az3, instead, and to avoid making changes that could affect connectivity to existing instances in the affected zone. Twelve components across EC2, ECS, ELB, Lightsail, Fargate and NAT Gateway, in both the general and Tokyo-specific entries, are listed against this incident, out of 61 components AWS tracks in total. No user reports were filed during the window. AWS has not published a post-mortem explaining the root cause beyond stating in its updates that the cause had been identified internally, without naming it publicly.

Learning

UptimeRobot's own probes against DynamoDB, S3 and SQS endpoints in other regions stayed at 100% uptime over 24 hours, 7 days and 30 days, and this incident was not registered against those checks, because the fault was scoped to a single availability zone inside one region and to control-plane actions like launches and provisioning rather than to data-plane reachability of the services being probed. That is the shape worth recognising: a region-and-zone-specific control plane failure can take down your ability to launch, scale or provision new resources while leaving existing, already-running infrastructure and endpoint-level checks completely green. If your own uptime monitoring only pings your application's public endpoints, it will not see this kind of fault at all, because the instances already running kept serving traffic throughout. AWS's own advice during the incident, to rely on your own health telemetry rather than their status API, only works if you also know whether the provider's side is degraded, which is exactly what endpoint pings from outside cannot tell you. Over the last 90 days AWS has logged 8 incidents with a median duration of 2 hours 33 minutes, so this one ran noticeably longer than typical. Your monitoring covers your half, UptimeRobot now watches the provider's half too, so next time you know which side broke without guessing.

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