On 21 October, Linode's parent Akamai opened a security advisory for two PHP remote code execution vulnerabilities and took parts of its own platform offline as a precaution. The advisory stayed open for 53h 54m before Akamai marked it resolved, and some tools it disabled were still offline when that resolution was filed.
Started
14:44 UTC
Duration
Lasted 2d 5h
Source
IsDown
Next time
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What happened?
The incident started at 14:44 UTC on 21 October as a Customer Security Advisory, not a standard infrastructure failure. Akamai said it was aware of CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, both PHP remote code execution vulnerabilities, and was assessing their impact across its platform. As a precaution it took down some Quick Deploy Apps, speed test pages, and parts of its website while that assessment ran. At 17:41 UTC Akamai updated the status to identified and narrowed the scope: by this point only the Cloud Infrastructure Speed Tests remained affected, with Quick Deploy Apps and the rest of the website back. A further identical update followed at 18:19 UTC, repeating the same scope and guidance with no new detail added. The advisory's own guidance throughout was aimed at customers, not at Akamai's infrastructure: it told you to patch PHP on your own Linode instances if you were running a vulnerable version, since the vulnerability lived in PHP itself rather than in Linode's control plane. At 20:37 UTC, 53h 54m after the advisory opened, Akamai filed a resolved update saying its assessment and mitigation work were complete. That same update said the Speed Tests would remain offline in the near term with no firm date given for their return. No component list was published alongside this incident, and no other outage was logged on Linode's status page that day. No user reports were filed during this window. The record contains a single filing thread of four updates, and nothing beyond it explains the gap between the 18:19 identified update and the 20:37 resolution.
Learning
This was a vulnerability advisory, not a conventional service outage, and it shows a different kind of risk than a dropped server or a failed region. The exposure sat in PHP on your own Linode instances, a layer Akamai explicitly told you to patch yourself, while the thing Akamai disabled on its own side was a secondary tool, the Speed Tests page, kept offline well past the advisory's resolution. Watching your own endpoints would not have caught this: your monitoring would show your app behaving normally right up until someone exploited the unpatched PHP code, and Akamai's advisory would show its platform as mitigated even though a tool it owns stayed dark for longer than the headline incident. That split, your layer needing a patch and their layer needing a toggle, is exactly the kind of thing a single uptime check on your own site cannot distinguish. Across the last 90 days Linode has logged 24 incidents with a median duration of 7 hours 18 minutes, so a 53h 54m advisory is unusually long even against that baseline. Your monitoring covers your half, UptimeRobot now watches the provider's half too, so next time you know which side broke without guessing.